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This article seeked to read the interconnected narratives of Sarah and Hagar (Genesis 16, 21) in 
terms of the hermeneutical lens of human dignity. For the purpose of this article, recent studies 
on the performative nature of emotions, which considered the central role of emotions such 
as pain, disgust and hatred in shaping the lives of individuals as well as the ways in which 
people relate to one another, were helpful in contemplating the situations of dehumanisation 
faced by both Sarah and Hagar as well as the broader question regarding upholding human 
worth in a context of indignity. This article furthermore considered the role of emotions in 
a conversation on ethics and particularly the way in which the narrative offered a fruitful 
avenue for considering Israel’s relationship to their neighbours – a line of interpretation that 
holds potential for reflecting on complex interracial and interethnic relationships in today’s 
global context.
Introduction
In recent years, the narrative of Sarah and Hagar as told in Genesis 16 and Genesis 21 has attracted 
quite a bit of attention. From feminist interpreters interested in bringing women’s voices out from 
the shadows (Trible 1984:9–36; Sakenfeld 2003:7–26; Jeansonne 1990:14–30, 43–52) to womanist 
interpreters who have highlighted the unique role of Hagar’s experience as a slave woman 
in order to denote the unique experiences of African American women (Williams 1993:15–33; 
Williams 2006:171–184; Weems 1988:1–22); all have provided fresh perspectives on this intriguing 
text.1 In a recent collection of essays, Hagar, Sarah, and their children, the rich interpretation history 
of this biblical narrative is documented when the authors trace the way Christian, Jewish and 
Islam interpreters respectively have claimed the story of Sarah and/or Hagar as their own (Trible 
& Russell 2006).2
Indeed, the interconnected stories of Sarah and Hagar, which forms part of the Abraham narrative 
cycle, is a fascinating account that denotes the interaction between Israel and her neighbours. In 
light of the interesting developments in Old Testament ethics that consider the role of narrative, 
one could argue that the narrative of Sarah and Hagar, which clearly shows the humanity of its 
characters, serves as a powerful vehicle for moral reflection.3 In this regard, Martha Nussbaum 
(2001:243) describes the role of literature as ‘a space with which we investigate and try out some 
of life’s possibilities’. She argues that when entering a narrative world, ‘the reader or spectator 
of a literary work is reading or watching the work but at the same time reading the world, and 
reading the own self’ (Nussbaum 2001:243) Drawing on Marcel Proust’s notion of literature 
as an ‘optical instrument’, Nussbaum (2001:243) argues that narrative may help the reader to 
contemplate personal realities, which, as will be evident in the case of Sarah and Hagar, may 
include some complex ethical issues.4 
As part of a larger project on gender and human dignity, this essay seeks to read the interconnected 
narratives of Sarah and Hagar (Gn 16, 21) in terms of the hermeneutical lens of human dignity. For 
the purpose of this article, recent studies on the performative nature of emotions, that consider 
the central role of emotions such as pain, disgust and hatred in shaping the lives of individuals 
as well as the ways in which people relate to one another, are helpful in contemplating the 
situations of dehumanisation faced by both Sarah and Hagar as well as the broader question 
1.For a good comparison of six of the most important feminist and womanist interpretations of the Hagar and Sarah stories see Weis 
(1996:253–273).
2.Cf. also Tikva Frymer-Kensky (2002:226) who demonstrates how various traditions claim this story as their own. So Sarah’s name in 
Hebrew means ’princess’, whereas in Islamitic tradition Hagar is not considered to be a slave but rather a princess married to Abraham. 
And in a Jewish Midrash, Hagar is viewed as a princess in the house of Pharaoh who after he had seen the wonders God performed 
for Abraham and Sarah thought it better for his daughter to be a servant in Abraham and Sarah’s household than a princess in his own 
house.
3.For example, Barton (2003:60–63). See also Emmanuel Levinas’s comment in Ethics and Infinity: ‘It also appears in the Scriptures, to 
which the humanity of man is exposed inasmuch as it is engaged in the world’ (p. 87, cited in Butler 2004:132).
4.Nussbaum (2001:243) argues as follow: ‘Literary works, by contrast, show us general plausible patterns of actions, “things such as 
might happen” in human life. When we grasp the patterns of salience offered by the work, we are also grasping our own possibilities.’
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regarding upholding human worth in a context of indignity. 
In light of Nussbaum’s notion of narrative as ‘an optical 
instrument’, this article will consider the role of emotions in 
a conversation on ethics and particularly the way in which 
narrative serves as a means of ‘show[ing] us the truth of 
our situation’ (Nussbaum 2001:244). In this regard, the 
interconnected nature of the plight of these two women 
from different ethnic and social backgrounds indeed offers 
a fruitful avenue for considering Israel’s relationship to their 
neighbours – a line of interpretation that holds a great deal of 
potential for reflecting on complex interracial and interethnic 
relationships in today’s global context.
This article is dedicated to Prof. Jurie le Roux. I was 
privileged to have had him teaching a class on Wisdom 
Literature to our class at Stellenbosch University when I was 
a seminary student at the Faculty of Theology. I was shaped 
by Prof. Le Roux’s passion for the Hebrew Bible as well as 
his ability to bridge the gap between the Old Testament and 
the contemporary context in which he had at that time been 
serving a congregation in Pretoria for more than 20 years. 
His ongoing presence in the field of Old Testament studies 
in South Africa, and particularly his commitment to the 
Pentateuch as evident in ProPent, has been an inspiration for 
my own work, including this current project on gender and 
human dignity in the biblical traditions. 
Narrating dehumanisation
One key feature of the story of Sarah and Hagar is the way 
in which the wellbeing of both these female characters are 
threatened by forces that prevent them from flourishing, that 
is to reach their full potential. These forces cause the women 
much pain, each in her own way. In the case of Sarah, her 
situation of barrenness is shown to be a great threat to her 
status in a society that places great value on women’s ability 
to bear children.5 And in the case of Hagar, being forced into 
a situation of limited or no resources during her expulsion 
into the wilderness is responsible for this Egyptian slave 
woman’s anguish.6 In both instances, these two women’s 
plight is portrayed as parallel as both women’s ability to bear 
offspring is put into jeopardy – Sarah, due to her inability to 
conceive and Hagar, faced with the very real possibility of 
losing her son to hunger and thirst. 
Remarkable about this narrative portrayal of indignity in 
the Sarah and Hagar narrative is the way in which the lives 
of these two women, who are portrayed as coming from 
different social and ethnic backgrounds, are interconnected, 
profoundly affecting one another. In order to explain their 
complex relationship, which serves as a fascinating means to 
contemplate not only the relationship between Israel and her 
neighbours but also on a contemporary level the interracial 
or interreligious relationships that are a key concern in many 
5.Cf. Weems 1991:34. Katheryn Pfisterer Darr (1991:154) highlights the religious 
dimension associated with barrenness when she argues that ‘Sarah lived for 
decades believing that God withheld children from her receiving constant reproach 
from her neighbours who wondered which sins were responsible for her infertility’.
6.Williams (1993:29) reads the wilderness experience in terms of the economic 
realities of poverty and homelessness.
societies today, some helpful insights come from recent work 
done by feminist theorists on the role of emotions in shaping 
moral behaviour. So Sarah Ahmed (2004:194) considers the 
role of emotions such as fear, hate, disgust and pain within 
what she calls the ‘contact zone’ in which people of different 
racial or ethnic backgrounds are shaped and reshaped at the 
moment of encounter. Such interaction quite often occurs 
within the context of past encounters which have left their 
indelible mark on the relationship in addition to creating 
new associations that shape future contact.
In this regard, the narrative of Sarah and Hagar offers, 
as feminist and womanist scholars have suggested, a 
prime example of a contact zone denoting the interaction 
between racialised others, which, as so often happens in 
interracial relationships, evokes strong emotions of disgust 
and contempt. Actually the first reference to disgust in 
this narrative relates to Hagar, who is said, after she had 
conceived, to look with contempt [ללק] upon her mistress, or 
as the Tanakh translation has it, ‘Her mistress was lowered 
in her esteem’.7 As her body grows heavy with child, Hagar 
regards her mistress Sarah as a ‘lightweight’. Sarah responds 
to this slighting by afflicting Hagar – the Hebrew word הנע 
carrying distinct connotations of violence (Weems 1991:36). 
This term, which elsewhere is used to describe Israel’s 
experience in bondage (Ex 1:11, 12; Dt 26:26), powerfully 
conveys Sarah’s dehumanising actions toward Hagar.8 
Sarah’s irritation and sense of disgust is evident in Genesis 
21:10 when Sarah complains to her husband about ‘this slave 
woman’, speaking in contempt and not even mentioning her 
name (cf. also Gn 16:5–6). That the power firmly lies in the 
hands of Sarah and Abraham though is evident from the fact 
that Abraham proceeds to tell his wife that Hagar is in her 
hand so that she can do with her whatever is good in her eyes 
(Gn 16:6). And in Genesis 21 we see how Sarah continues 
this abuse when she incites Abraham to banish Hagar and 
Ishmael to a life in the wilderness that may very likely have 
led to the demise of mother and child (v. 10).
It is evident from this account that the acts of contempt, 
violence and abuse have their roots in what appears to be a 
mutual sense of disgust. But what function does this emotion 
of disgust have in the Sarah and Hagar narrative and how 
does it help us in our ethical deliberation on the issues evoked 
by the interrelationship of these two women? The following 
aspects regarding the nature and function of emotions such 
as disgust and hatred are important for considering the way 
in which the dehumanisation of either or both women in this 
narrative is narrated.
Emotions and ethics
Firstly, it is remarkable that the lives of these women intersect 
at the very point at which Sarah is most vulnerable. Martha 
Nussbaum (2001) rightly has proposed that:
7.Cf. also Sarah’s self-assessment of the situation when she says in Gn 16:5 that ‘I was 
slight in her eyes’, which reflects her diminishing of status with referenced to Hagar 
(Trible 2006:39).
8.In this regard, Trible (2006:40) proposes that ‘ironically, the verb depicts here the 
suffering of a lone Egyptian woman in Canaan, the land of her bondage to the 
Hebrews’. See also Darr (1991:13). Trible (1984:13) notes in her earlier essay on this 
text that ‘no deity comes to deliver her from bondage but instead she flees from her 
oppressor as Israel would later flee from Pharaoh’.
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the roots of anger, hatred, and disgust lie very deep in the 
structure of human life, in our ambivalent relation to our lack 
of control over objects and the helplessness of our own bodies. 
(p. 234)
In the case of Sarah, it is indeed her situation of barrenness 
that directly is responsible for causing a great deal of pain 
and suffering in the life of Hagar when she uses Hagar’s 
body as a means to secure a baby for herself and her husband. 
When this plan does not quite work out, she afflicts Hagar. 
Moreover, after the wondrous occasion of the birth of her son, 
when Sarah sees Isaac playing (with Ishmael), she perceives 
Ishmael’s presence to be a threat to her son.9 Ahmed (2004) 
says it well:
Such narratives work by generating a subject that is endangered 
by imagined others whose proximity threatens not only to take 
something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth), but 
to take the place of the subject. The presence of this other is 
imagined as a threat to the object of love. (p. 43)
Ahmed (2004:43) continues that this perceived threat serves 
the function of transforming ‘the bodies of others’ ‘into “the 
hated” through a discourse of pain’. The primary subject is 
construed as being injured or hurt by the presence of the 
other.10 This insight is particularly significant for how people 
in pain treat one another – personal and collective suffering 
often resulting in violence.11
Secondly, the emotion of disgust can be said to be profoundly 
ambivalent, encompassing at the same time a strong 
attraction toward the subject or object that is found to be 
repulsing (Ahmed 2004:84–85). Ahmed (2004) writes with 
reference to disgust’s twin emotion hatred: 
Where there is hate, there is obviously an excessive need for the 
object. In other words, hate is opposed to indifference: in hate, 
the object makes a difference, but cannot satisfy the subject, 
whose need goes beyond it. (p. 51)
In the story of Sarah and Hagar, it is clear that Sarah, due to 
her inability to bear children, needs Hagar and is drawn to 
her. But we also see the ambivalence at the heart of this desire 
when Sarah turns on Hagar in an expression of profound 
disgust. 
Thirdly, the immediate effect of disgust is that it causes the 
subject to create distance between the self and the object or 
subject he or she finds disgusting. Ahmed (2004:94) writes 
9.There is a certain ambiguity associated with this text as to what is transpiring 
between the two sons. Genesis 21:9 contains the ambiguous reading that Sarah 
saw Ishmael the son of Hagar ‘playing’ [קחצמ]. The LXX inserts the object ‘with 
Isaac’ which is followed by the NRSV translation in order to clarify that Ishmael was 
playing with Isaac (Frymer-Kensky 2002:234). Some commentators assert though 
that Ishmael did not play with Isaac but made fun of him. Or perhaps Ishmael is 
playing Isaac, thus pretending to be the heir? See Trible’s suggestion that Ishmael is 
‘Isaacing’ (Trible 2006:44).
10.In her book, Ahmed (2004:27) considers the politics of pain, that is, what it is that 
pain does. As she argues: ‘Pain is … bound up with how we inhabit the world, how 
we live in relationship to surfaces, bodies and objects that make up our dwelling 
places’. Moreover, she considers ‘how pain is involved in the production of uneven 
effects, in the sense that pain does not produce a homogenous group of bodies 
who are together in their pain’ (p. 31).
11.Judith Butler (2004:28–29) characterises violence as follows: ‘Violence is surely a 
touch of the worst order, a way a primary human vulnerability to other humans 
is exposed in its most terrifying way, a way in which we are given over, without 
control, to the will of another, a way in which life itself can be expunged by the 
wilful action of another’. 
that ‘to abject something is literally to cast something out, or 
to expel something’. Employing the example of food that is 
found to be disgusting, a person would spit out an undesired 
object. On a social level, disgust may have a similar function, 
resulting in casting out or removing of an undesirable 
element. In the narrative of Sarah and Hagar, we see this 
vividly illustrated: firstly, Hagar removes herself from the 
situation of contempt when she runs away, and in the second 
instalment of the narrative, she is cast out or expelled by 
Sarah. 
In this regard, emotions such as disgust and hatred are 
intrinsically involved in creating boundaries. Drawing on 
the work of Judith Butler, Sarah Ahmed (2004:12) argues 
that emotions such as disgust or hatred have an inherent 
world-making quality. It is by means of the repetition of 
these emotions that worlds are evoked, that identities are 
negotiated and that boundaries are fixed.12 She describes the 
effect of disgust as follows: 
Disgust does something, certainly: through disgust, bodies 
‘recoil’ from their proximity, as a proximity that is felt as 
nakedness or as an exposure on the skin surface. … So disgust, 
even defined simply as bad taste, shows us how the boundaries 
that allow the distinction between subjects and objects are 
undone in the moment of their making. (Ahmed 2004:83)
In this regard, one finds in the Hebrew Bible ample evidence 
of the importance for Israel of drawing boundaries between 
themselves and the Canaanites who were to be found both 
inside and outside of Israel (Stone 2004:110–134; Runions 
2011:53). For instance, Ken Stone (2005) has argued that the 
laws regarding food and sexuality exhibit a similar function, 
that is to draw clear boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, in 
order to quell anxiety, fear and disgust that may emerge from 
any uncertainty about borders between these groups. 
Fourthly, even though disgust or hatred is always directed 
at a particular person, this emotion is often transposed 
upon a group as a whole.13 With regard to the story of Sarah 
and Hagar one sees how the repeated reference to Hagar, 
the Egyptian, serves the function of sharply drawing the 
boundaries between Israel and one of her most significant 
neighbours. Tikva Frymer-Kensky (2002:232–233) has 
pointed out that this narrative of Sarah and Hagar ought 
to be read in the larger context of Israel’s sojourn in Egypt 
where the roles of master or slave is dramatically reversed.14 
It thus seems that the micro-story of Sarah’s personal crisis of 
not being able to bear a child and her treatment of her servant 
12.Ahmed (2004:12) formulates it as follows: ‘Feminist and queer scholars have 
shown us that emotions “matter” for politics: emotions show us how power 
shapes the very surface of bodies as well [as sic] worlds.” See also Butler 1993:9.
13.Ahmed (2004:49) makes the important point that ‘hate may respond to the 
particular, but it tends to do so by aligning the particular with the general; “I hate 
you because you are this or that”, where the “this” or “that” evokes a group that 
the individual comes to stand for or stand in for’.
14.Frymer-Kensky (2002:236) says it well: ‘The story of Sarai and Hagar is not a 
story of the conflict between “us” and “other”, but between “us” and “another 
us”. Hagar is the type of Israel, she is the redeemed slave, she is “us”.’ See also 
Jeansonne (1990:28) who argues that Israel’s genesis as a people is fragile and 
they continuously have been threatened by other nations – also by the children of 
Ishmael. But as she points out, ‘yet the narrator does not portray this enemy of the 
people of Israel as an entity completely alien from themselves’.
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Hagar can be read on a macro-level of Israel contemplating 
their relationship with the Egyptians under whose hand they 
suffered serious affliction as narrated in the book of Exodus. 
So even though the Egyptian slave woman Hagar is the object 
of the scorn and contempt of her Israelite mistress Sarah, a 
couple of chapters later in Exodus 1, it will be the Israelites 
who find themselves in bondage. When the Egyptians are in 
a position of power and the Israelites are the slaves serving 
their harsh slave masters, it is evident that the Egyptians are 
greatly dependent on the Israelites to conduct their large-
scale building projects. But at the same time, they fear and 
are being repulsed by the Israelites – in its most extreme 
fashion leading to the genocide of the baby boys in Exodus 1.
It may well be that Israel’s sojourn in Egypt is responsible 
for facilitating this contact zone between Israel and Egypt – a 
significant relationship that is equalled by Israel’s tumultuous 
relationship with her neighbouring nations in Canaan.15 The 
narrative of Sarah and Hagar thus is situated in this ongoing 
process of identity negotiation that transpired against the 
backdrop of the affliction Israel experienced in Egypt but 
also the real and perceived threat of superpowers such as 
Babylon and Persia.16
Finally, Ahmed’s notion of the ‘stickiness’ of signs (2004:92) 
is particularly helpful in explaining how emotions rely on 
stereotypes in order to fix the meaning of the other. She 
writes that emotions can become sticky, suggesting that a 
particular emotion may circulate around a subject, affixing 
itself to other concepts so that they become fused with the 
original concept. The example she employs relates to the 
term typically used in England, ‘Paki’ that through its use 
with other words such as ‘immigrant’, ‘outsider’, and ‘dirty’ 
has come to be viewed as a slur or an insult. This cumulative 
meaning generated by these signs being stuck together is 
responsible for the fact that the reference ‘Paki’ has obtained 
such secondary associations.17 
With regard to the Hebrew Bible, Erin Runion (2011:49–51), 
who introduces these ideas of Ahmed on the stickiness 
of emotions into a Hebrew Bible context, argues that the 
Canaanite other quite often is associated with sexuality 
and immorality per se – the prostitute Rahab being a prime 
example. A similar tendency may be noted with reference 
to Hagar – her characterisation as exceptionally fertile may 
be associated with this notion of the Egyptian other being 
associated with hypersexuality.18 Actually, in the rabbinic 
interpretation of this narrative, one finds a fascinating 
15.See Erin Runion’s insightful essay (2011:45–74) on disgust and how it functions 
to draw boundaries between Israel and the Canaanite ‘others’ in her midst. See 
also Frymer-Kenski’s view (2002:236) that for Israel other nations such as Moab, 
Amnon, Ishmael and Edom ‘have destinies that are closely intertwined with Israel’s.
16.See for example a recent volume on identity formation in the Persian Period that 
highlights the importance of maintaining boundaries, drawing sharp divisions 
between the returning exiles and the people of the land (Jonker 2011).
17.Ahmed (2004:92) writes: ‘But it is not just surfaces that materialise through 
disgust. As one object is substituted for another, or moves into another, a border is 
temporarily affected, despite the fact that neither object is inherently disgusting. 
Such objects become sticky as an effect of this substitution.’
18.Darr (1991:134) cites a rabbinic interpretation that claims that Hagar became 
pregnant after only one sexual encounter.
example of how Hagar as an Egyptian woman becomes 
associated with promiscuity.19 In an exposition on Hagar’s 
act of taking an Egyptian wife for her son Ishmael (Gn 21:21), 
one finds in a tenth-century midrash on the book of Genesis, 
Aggadat Bereshit, the following connection between Hagar’s 
fertility and her ethnic identity (based upon the preconceived 
notion in the Hebrew mind set as reflected in Ezekiel 23 that 
Egyptians are to be considered sexually promiscuous). In this 
midrash, Hagar is compared to the fat of a donkey, which 
will retain its odour even if one would pour rose oil on it:
Even though its smell became pleasant from the rose oil, it ended 
up stinking as it had before… The fat of a donkey is Hagar the 
Egyptian, as it says of the Egyptians (Ezk 23:20) ‘whose members 
were like those of asses…’ Hagar cleaved to Abraham and gave 
birth to Ishmael… but in the end she returned to her stench as 
it is written, ‘And his mother took for him a woman from the 
land of Egypt’ (Gn 21:21). (Cohen quoted in Reinhartz & Simma-
Walfish 2006:106) 
This expression of disgust in terms of stereotypical ideas 
about the other also finds its way into the contemptuous way 
Israel is portrayed in Exodus 1. The remarkable growth of 
the Israelites is expressed by the narrator in his description 
of how the ‘Israelites swarmed’ ([ץרש] v. 7). Moreover, in 
verse 19 the midwives play into this dehumanising discourse 
when they tell the Pharaoh that the Israelite women are 
like animals – they give birth even before the midwives 
arrive.20 Ahmed (2004:46) points out with reference to such 
stereotypical designations that words like ‘swarmed’, ‘flood’ 
or ‘swamped’ generate effects: ‘they create impressions of 
others as those who have invaded the space of the nation, 
threatening its existence’.
The expression of disgust in terms of such stereotypical 
notions may have the effect of blocking new meanings as 
such oft-repeated phrases are bound to bodies so that it 
obscures new meanings (Ahmed 2004:92). However, Ahmed 
(2004:64) notes that the very repetition of such stereotypes 
‘that is required to enable such a fixation renders them a 
site of insecurity rather than security’. She argues that ‘such 
impossible truths become compelling precisely insofar as 
they might be lost on the way’ (Ahmed 2004:64). Public 
discourse thus needs to keep these stereotypical ideas alive in 
order to maintain clear boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
And yet, it may be possible to break through these stereotypes; 
for signs and emotions to become ‘unstuck’. Runions 
(2011:54), who employs Ahmed’s work on this matter, puts it 
well: ‘… [I]t seems to be that signs are never quite so static as 
they might appear. With some pushing and pulling, objects 
and affect can perhaps be unstuck and reconfigured’. In the 
next section, we will consider the possibilities already within 
the text for ‘unsticking’ the emotions of disgust and hatred 
19.Ahmed (2004:44) writes: ‘Note the work that is being done through this metonymic 
slide: mixed race couplings and immigration becomes readable as (like) forms of 
rape or molestation; an invasion of the body of the nation, evoked here as the 
vulnerable and damaged bodies of the white woman and child.’
20.Renita Weems (1992:32–33) argues that the racial differences and stereotypes 
assumed by this story are not challenged by the characters and/or the narrator. 
Rather the story simply inverts these stereotypes in order to serve its own 
ideological interests. Weems ends her essay with the question whether one can 
use this story for liberation, answering as follows: ‘Not without due caution’. 
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that feature so strongly in this text and thus resisting the 
dehumanisation narrated in the Sarah and Hagar narrative.
Resisting dehumanisation
Thus far we have seen how emotions such as disgust, hatred 
and pain work together to create a situation of dehumanisation 
experienced especially by Hagar in the Sarah and Hagar 
narrative. From being referred to as ‘that slave women’ 
instead of being called by her name, to being subjected to 
harsh treatment and abuse and finally being expelled from 
Abraham and Sarah’s house, the biblical account vividly 
narrates the dehumanisation of this Egyptian slave girl. One 
would have expected that this narrative movement would 
finalise the removal of Hagar by writing her out of Israel’s 
history. And yet, one is surprised by the continuing presence 
of Hagar in the text.
In this regard, some helpful perspectives come from the work 
of Judith Butler who, in her works Precarious Lives and Frames 
of War, argues that certain lives are considered by society to 
be more ‘grievable’ than others; more valuable and hence 
more worthy of protection (Butler 2004:32; cf. also Butler 
2009). Writing in the aftermath of 9/11, as well as the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Butler rightly considers the question 
who society chooses to remember. She asks: ‘Who counts as 
human? Whose lives count as lives?’21 Conversely, within 
this hierarchy of grief, those who are considered less than 
fully human are susceptible to violence – of which perhaps 
the worst is the violence of derealisation.22 Butler continues to 
ask how one should think of this act of negation. She suggests 
that in society the dominant discourse has already done the 
work of dehumanisation (Butler 2004): 
It is one thing to argue that first, on the level of discourse, certain 
lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, 
that they fit no dominant frame for the human, and that their 
dehumanization occurs first, at this level, and that this level 
then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers 
the message of dehumanization that is already at work in the 
culture.23 (p. 36)
In contrast, Butler (2004:20) considers the important role 
of obituaries to document a life by revealing details of the 
person’s life. She writes: ‘It is a means by which life becomes, 
or fails to become, a publically grievable life, an icon for 
national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes 
noteworthy’ (Butler 2004:34).
21.Butler (2004:34) continues: ‘It is another thing to say that discourse effects 
violence though omission. If 200,000 Iraqi children were killed during the Gulf War 
and its aftermath, do we have an image, a frame for any of those lives, singly or 
collectively? Is there a story we might find about those deaths in the media? Are 
there names attached to those children?’ 
22.Butler (2004:33) writes: ‘What is real? Whose lives are real? How might reality 
be remade? Those who are unreal have, in a sense, already suffered the violence 
of derealisation. What, then, is the relation between violence and those lives 
considered as “unreal”?’
23.Butler (2004:36) describes the effect of dehumanisation in discourse as follows: 
‘Dehumanization’s relation to discourse is complex. It would be too simple to claim 
that violence simply implements what is already happening in discourse, such that 
a discourse on dehumanization produces treatment, including torture and murder, 
structured by the discourse. Here the dehumanization emerges at the limits of 
discursive life, limits established through prohibition and foreclosure. There is less 
a dehumanizing discourse at work here than a refusal of discourse that produces 
dehumanization as a result. Violence against those who are already not quite 
living, that is, living in a state of suspension between life and death, leaves a mark 
that is no mark.’
In the case of the biblical account of Sarah and Hagar, it 
is quite significant that Hagar is not written out of Israel’s 
history but that her suffering is remembered. The narrative 
told in Genesis 16 and 21 serves the important function of 
humanising Hagar and acknowledging her grief and loss. 
Hagar’s presence in the text is all the more remarkable in light 
of Butler’s point that society often effects violence through 
omission. Analogous to Butler’s notion of the important role 
of obituaries, one sees in this biblical narrative an instance 
of how Hagar’s suffering is recognised by God, who calls 
Hagar by name – Phyllis Trible (2006:40) rightly points out 
that Hagar is the first woman in the Hebrew Bible to receive 
an annunciation when God speaks to her and not, like the 
other characters thus far, about her.24 Hagar moreover 
becomes the only woman to receive the promise of a long line 
of descendants through her own destiny (Williams 1993:22; 
Frymer-Kenski 2002:230).25 Indeed God emerges as the ‘God 
of seeing’ (El Roeh) as Hagar in turn would name God, so 
constituting the first act of theologising in the Hebrew Bible 
(Trible 1984:18).
In some sense, Hagar’s continuing presence in the text after 
she is expelled from the house of Abraham and Sarah serves 
as a type of memorial – some intimate details of Hagar’s life 
are shared in the continuation of her narrative in Genesis 21 
and so her life is cemented into Israel’s consciousness. The 
reader observes in v 16 how she alone in the wilderness raises 
her voice in lament, protesting her own plight as well as what 
this expulsion is about to do to her child. And after her eyes 
are opened and she sees the source of her salvation in the 
form of a well, providing life-sustaining water, the narrative 
divulges further details about the life the mother and son 
would make for themselves in the wilderness – a life that 
may be difficult in the harsh conditions of the wilderness, 
but a life lived in freedom (Frymer-Kenski 2002:236).26 It is 
significant that the last thing we see of Hagar is an act of 
agency on her part as she chooses an Egyptian wife for her 
son – so securing his (and her own) future.
These narrative details about Hagar and her life outside of 
Israel’s purview have the function of breaking through the 
disgust in the narrative surrounding her ethnic identity and 
blocking new meanings. By means of her story, the Egyptian 
other is reconfigured to become a person in her own right – 
the stereotypes attached to her body becoming unstuck. This 
process of rehumanisation is an ongoing process though. As 
we have mentioned before, in subsequent chapters, Israel 
will be the subject of dehumanising discourse and in need of 
resisting harmful stereotypes rooted in disgust.
24.The narrative is not devoid of complexity. So we see how God sends Hagar back 
to the house of slavery where she likely may suffer further affliction. Womanist 
scholar Delores Williams (1993:21) has read this particular narrative detail in 
terms of the theme of survival and quality of life – it was in the best interest of the 
mother and her unborn child to return to Abraham and Sarah’s house and use the 
resources this dwelling has to offer. 
25.God’s promise to Hagar, though, about a future for her and her child is ambiguous 
when Hagar is promised that her son will be ‘a wild ass of a man’, suggesting a 
mixture of freedom and self-determination, but also foreshadowing continuing 
strife between Ishmael and his neighbours.
26.Weems (1988:15) suggests that perhaps it is better that Hagar and Ishmael left in 
order to be able to stand on their own feet. 
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Conclusion
As stated in the beginning of the essay the narrative of 
Sarah and Hagar has the potential to serve as a space for 
contemplating complex ethical issues arising from the 
interaction that continues to occur between interracial and/
or interreligious relationships. The story of Sarah and Hagar 
is not a happy one though – the relationship between the two 
women disintegrates completely and ends with the expulsion 
of Hagar. But as Martha Nussbaum (2001:244) has proposed, 
‘painful literary experiences’, which confirm that we are 
‘needy and limited creature[s]’, are helpful in that they may 
assist us in reaching a greater understanding of ourselves as 
well as of others.
One example comes from the work of Elie Wiesel (1986:248–
249) who in an exposition on ‘Ishmael and Hagar’ blames 
Sarah who, in his mind, could have done better by loving 
both Isaac and Ishmael. He laments: ‘If only she could have 
brought them together instead of setting them apart! Maybe 
some of today’s tragedies would have been avoided’. In this 
quote Wiesel refers to the Palestinian crisis that, according to 
him, has its roots in the separation of brothers. One could add 
though numerous instances of interracial, interethnic and 
interreligious strife that mar our world today – of particular 
significance for us in South Africa with our complex and still 
often painful race relations.27
The story of Sarah and Hagar thus may help us contemplate 
the effect of disgust on the bodies involved in the contact 
zone. As Martha Nussbaum (2001:299) has argued, disgust 
is the enemy of compassion. She argues that in a society’s 
pursuit for justice, which is closely associated with the 
obligation to cultivate compassion in its people, ‘the 
impediments to compassion’s ethical work’ is ‘supplied by 
shame, resentment, envy, and disgust’. We have moreover 
seen how disgust can block new meanings, being responsible 
for stereotypical notions that taint the relationship between 
racialised others. And in its most extreme manifestation of 
disgust, certain bodies may become fixed as objects of hate 
which may result in their destruction in what is known as 
hate crimes (Ahmed 2004:57, 60).
The Sarah and Hagar narrative implores the reader not to 
ignore the injustice done to those who literature (and society) 
deem disgusting or unfit. For as Ahmed (2004:57) warns us: 
‘To allow such bodies to disappear in our own analysis would 
be to repeat the crime rather than to redress its injustice’. As 
biblical interpreters we are called to redress injustice and 
lift up interpretations that may restore the dignity of men, 
women and children scarred in situations of dehumanisation.
27.Darr (1991:152–155), who cites Wiesel, questions the idea that the woman 
receives all the blame for the shortcomings of an inherently unjust patriarchal 
society. See also Weems (1988:2), who argues that it is not fair to make the story 
of Sarah and Hagar ‘carry all the weight of the history of race relationships in the 
modern world’. Nevertheless, Weems highlights the role economic injustice plays 
in exacerbating the racial prejudice that already exists between these women who 
are co-victims in a patriarchal society. 
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